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VALIDITY AND EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS IN 
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Professor of Law, Yale University, School of Law 
There is no..topic in the conflict of laws in regard to which there is 
greater uncertainty than that of contracts. In this country there is no 
agreement even regarding the fundamental principles that should 
govern. Elsewhere there is less dispute concerning the general princi-
ples, but much difference of view in their application to concrete situa-
tions. Under these circumstances a discussion of the question in broad 
outline may not be amiss. Since an inquiry into the law governing 
"capacity" to contract and ,the "formalities" with which a contract 
must be executed raises a number of special problems, it has been 
deemed best to omit the discussion of this phase of the subject in the 
present article, except in so far as it may bear upon the intention 
theory in general, and to restrict its scope to the intrinsic validity of 
contracts, and to 'their effects. The purpose of this article will have 
been attained if it has pointed out the difficulties in the way of finding 
a simple solution of the conflicts arising from the diversity of laws 
relating to contracts (apart from capacity and form), and if it nas suc-
ceeded in suggesting, in the light of the best juri~tic thought of the 
world, some guiding principles by means of which the solution of the 
particular problems may be found. In this problem, as in most others 
arisin_g in the conflict of laws, some light may be derived from the jur-
istic discussions of foreign writers and from the experience of foreign 
nations. So far as it may serve the purpose of this article the foreign 
law and literature will therefore be considered. 
I. 
Let us examine in the first place the rules which the courts purport 
to follow in determining the intrinsic validity and effects of contracts 
from the standpoint of the conflict of laws. 
A. ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW 
(r) American Law. A few years ago Professor Beale undertook 
the laborious task of examining in detail the English and American 
cases on this subject.1 It appears from his article that our law is in a 
state of great confusion and that the courts of the same state often 
1 (1910) 23 H..uv. L. REv. 79-
[s6s] 
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follow different theories. By way of general summary Professor 
Beale concluded that at the time of writing six states, one of which 
was doubtful, had adopted the law of the place of making; that I6 
states, of which five were doubtful, had adopted the law of the place ·of 
performance; and that I I states, besides the District of Columbia, had 
adopted the law intended by the parties.2 The federal courts have 
generally applied the law of the state or country intended by the parties. 
Some of them have presumed that the parties intended their contract 
to be governed by the law of the place of making; others, by that of 
the place of performance.3 
(2) English Law. That the law intended by the parties controls 
the rights and duties arising out of valid contracts is settled law. Dicta 
in the decisions adopt . this principle also as regards the validity of 
contracts, and Dicey4 maintains that the law with reference to which 
the parties contracted has been fully adopted by the English courts. 
According to Westlake/ 
"the law by which to determine the intrinsic validity and effects of a 
contract will be selected in England on substantial considerations, the 
preference being given to the country with which the transaction has 
the most real connection, and not to the law of the place of contract 
as such." 
No case appears to have arisen in England where the nature of the 
contract and circumstances of the case pointed to a law which would 
render the contract invalid, and where the intention was expressed to 
• I d.,. 2fYl. 
1 Jd., IOG-IOJ • 
• Conflict of Laws (2d ed. I!)OS) 529, 545, 556. After stating in Exception I 
that a foreign contract will not be enforced in England if it would be contrary 
to public policy, Dicey adds the following: 
"Exception 2.-A contract (whether lawful by its proper law or not) is invalid 
if the making thereof is unlawful by the law of the country where it is ·made 
(lex loci contractus) (?)" (p. 55I). 
"Exception 3.-A contract (whether lawful by its ·proper law or not) is, in 
general, invalid in so far as (I) the performance of it is unlawful by the law of 
thi -country where the contract is to be performed (lex loci solutionis); or (2) 
the contract forms part of a transaction which is unlawful by the law of the 
country where the transaction is to take place. . .. 
"SUB-RULE 3:-In the absence of countervailing considerations, the following 
presumptions as to the proper law of a contract have effect:-
"First Presumption.-Prima facie the proper law of the contract is presumed to 
be the law of the country where the contract is made (lex loci contractus); this 
presumption applies with special force when the contract is to be performed 
wholly in the country where it is made, or may be performed anywhere, but it 
may apply to a contract partly or even wholly .to be performed in another country. 
"Second Prcsumption.-When the contract is made in one country, and is to be 
performed either wholly or partly in another, then the proper law of the con-
tract, especially as to the mode of performance, may be presumed to be the law 
of the country where the performance is to take place (lex loci solutionis)" (p. 
563). 
• Private International Law (5th ed. I9I2) 305. 
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have the contract governed by another law which would support it, 
but according to Westlake,6 it may be confidently expected that the 
courts will under such circumstances decline to uphold the contract. 
B. CONTINENTAL LAW 
( 1) French Law. The intention of the parties is said to govern the 
intrinsic validity and effects of contracts,'~' subject to the rules of public 
order.8 In the absence of an express stipulation or special circum"" 
stances showing a contrary intention, the parties will be deemed to 
have contracted with reference to the law of the place where the con-
tract was entered into.0 Where the parties have the same nationality, 
the presumption will be that they contracted with reference to their 
nationallaw.10 
( 2) German Law. The intention of the parties is controlling, 
subject to the rules of public policy. Where the intention of the 
parties is not expressed, and does not appear from the circumstances, 
the le% loci was formerly applied.11 Through Savigny's influence the 
• Ibid. 
• Cass. (Feb. 23, I864), (I864) Sirey, Pt. I, 385; (March 9, I8gi), (I8gi) Dal-
loz, Pt. I,459; (Feb."6, I900), (Igoo) Sirey, Pt. I, I6I, and note; (Dec. 5, I9IO), 
(I9~I) 7 REvuE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL l'RIVE, 3g5. 
Matters relating to reality of consent are often regarded as belonging to 
"capacity" and as being subject therefore to the personal law. Aubry (18g6) 23 
CLUNEr, 472-474; Audinet, Principes e/Cmentaires du droit international pri've 
(2d ed. xgo6), 295; Durand, Essai de droit international prive (1884) 419; 
Despagriet, Precis de droit international prive (5th ~d. Igog), 903-904; 8 Laurent, 
Le droit civil international (I88I) 228-229; Pillet, Principes de droit international 
prive (I903) 450 note I, 456. Valery holds that all rules relating to reality of 
consent are rules of public order, so that a contract will not be enforced if it is 
contrary to the provisions of the le~ fori in this respect. Manuel de droit inter-
national prive (I9I4) 958. 
8 The term "public order" is used in many different senses. Valery, for 
example, operates with four varieties. With respect to the defence of illegality 
he holds that if the contract is valid according to the French local rules, the 
foreign contract will be enforced: If it is illegal·according to the local French 
law, no effect will be given to it in the following cases: (I) If at least one of the 
parties is French and the performance of the contract would violate a French law 
of "personal" public order; (2) if the contract is to be performed in France 
and such performance violates the French "territorial" public order; (3) if 
the case falls within the French "personal and territorial'' public order, for 
example, i£ one of the parties is French, or if the contract is made between 
.foreigners in France; (4) if the conract violates French rules of "absolute" 
public order. Valery, op. cit., ¢2-g65. 
• See cases in note 7. See also Bard, Precis de droit international penal et prive 
(I883) 266; Despagnet, op. cit., 882; Durand, op. cit., 420; 2 Laurent, op. cit., 
4I4-4I6; Surville et Arthuys, Cours etementaire de droit international prive (6th 
ed. 1915) 300; Weiss, Traite de droit international prive (2d ed. I912) 364-
10 App. Paris (March 19, I907), (I907) NoUVELLE REvUE PRATIQUE DE DRorr 
INTERNATIONAL l'RIVE, 302; Audinet, op. cit., 283; Surville et Arthuys, op. cit., 
299; 4 Weiss, op. cit., 355. 
11 I Gierke, Deutsches Privatrechf (1895) 232, note 67. 
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courts have abandoned this view in .favor of the law of the place of 
performance. Gebhard's draft of the German Civil Code relating to 
private international law pronounced itself in favor of the "debtor's" 
domicil, the doctrine first championed by Bar. The first commission 
did not accept Gebhard's recommendation, and preferred, in the absence 
of circumstances pointing to a contrary intention, the application of the 
lex loci. This rule _was retained by the second commission, but the 
Federal Council struck out all provisions relating to the intrinsic valid-
ity and effects of contracts and left the question for determination by 
the courts. Although the reason for the action of the Federal Council 
is not clear, it was probably in part due to the fact that it did not regard 
the science of the conflict of laws, so far as it relates to the above 
matter, as sufficiently advanced to warrant the- adoption of a final 
rule.12 Since the adoption of the civil code, the courts have continued 
to follow the law of the place of performance/3 except where the nature 
of the contract or the circumStances of the case convinced the court 
that the partie~ contracted with reference to some other law.14 Some 
decisions have been in favor of the law of the debtor's domicil.15 In 
the case of bilateral agreements, where the place of performance of one 
party is different from the place of performance of the other, the 
duties of each party are determined with reference to the lex solutionis 
of his own part of the contract,16 unless, in accordance with the pre-
sumed intention of the parties, a single law can be deemed applicable 
to the rights and duties of both contracting partiesY Such a single 
la\v has been held to apply also where the existence of the contract 
itself is in question.18 
(3) Italian Law. Under the influence of Mancini, Article 9 of the 
Prelimin~ry Dispositions of the Civil Code was adopted, the third 
paragraph of which provides as follows: 
"The substance and ef.(ect of obligations are deemed to be regulated 
by the law of the place in which the acts were done, and, if the con-
tracting parties are foreigners and belong to the same nationality, by 
their national law. The showing of a different intent is reserved in 
each case." 
(4) Lww of other countrie~. The rest of the continental countries 
12 Krohn, Die Vertragsobligatio11e1t in materieller Beziehung nach deutschem 
i1~ternationalen Privatrecht (1909) 16. 
13 Imperial Court (April 23, 1903) 54 RG 316; (July 4, 1904) I5 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FUR INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, 285; (Dec. 5, 19II) 23 id. 346; (Oct. II, 
1910) 24 id. 320; (Oct. 2, 19n) 23 id. 340; (April 19, 1910) 73 RG 379; (March 
i1, 1919) 95 RG 164 . 
1
' Imperial Court (Sept. 21, 1899) 44 RG 300. 
1
• Imperial Court (Oct. 12, 1905) 61 RG 343; (Feb. 12, xgo6) 62 RG 379· 
10 Imperial Court (Oct. 13, 18g4) 34 RG 191; {April28, 1900) 46 RG 193 (Apz:il 
21, 1902) 51 RG 218; (June 16, 1903) 55 RG 105. 
17 Imperial Court (April4, 1!)08) 68 RG 203; (Apr. 19, 1910) 73 RG 379; (Feb. 
4, 1913) 81 RG 273· 
18 Imperial Court (Feb. 13, 18g1) 47 Seuffert's AatHIV, 3· 
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appear likewise to have. adopted the intention of the parties as the tes~ 
of 'the law determining the essential validity and effects of contracts,. 
subject to their respective rules of p~blic policy. Where the· inten-
tion is not expressed, Belgium,20 Holland,21 Portugal.22 Russia,23 and 
Spain2~ presume that the parties contra.cted with reference to the law of 
the place of contracting. Greece25 and Hung~ry26 prefer in such a case 
the law of the place of contracting, and Sweden,21 that of the domicil 
of the debtor. In Norway the law of the place of contracting governed 
formerly,28 but there appears to be a strong tendency in favor of the 
law of the debtor's domicil.2~ The Swiss courts appear to apply, 
unless an intention to the contrary 'is shown, the law of the place of 
contracting if the contract is made in Switzerland.30 Swiss law has 
been applied also where a contract made abroad was to be performed 
in Switzerland30a. or where Swiss subjects entered into a contract while 
on a visit abroad.31 Austria pr~sumes with respect to .contracts made 
between foreigners in Austria that they contracted with reference to 
the locallaw.82 The same presumption exists where a f~reigner enters 
into a cqntract with another foreigner or with an Austrian abroad.88 
Where a foreigner enters into a contract in Austria whereby he confers 
only benefits upon the other contracting party, Austrian law or his 
national law will cqntrol, according as the one law or the other favors 
most the validity of the transaction.8~ This rule holds. true whether 
the other contracting party is ati Austrian or a foreigner. The applica-
tion of Austdan law is mandatory, so as to exclude the intention of the 
.. Trib. Civ. de Charleroi (June 3, 1901) 30 CLUNEr, 8g8; Trib. de Commerce 
de Bruxelles (Jan. 2, 1902), (1903) 3o CLUNEr, 409; App. Brussels (June 29, 
1907), (xgo8) 35 CLuNEr, 562. 
:11. Court of Appeals of Arnheim (Jan. 19, x8g8), (xgoo) Z7 CLuNEr, 841>; Court 
of Appeals of Bois-de-Due (Jan. 22, I90I), (1904) 31 CLuNEr, 457 • 
.. Commercial Code, sec. 4-
.. I Klibanski, Handbuch des gesamten russichen Zivilrechts (xgu) 445; 
(1904) '14 ZErrsCHRIFr FUR DA~ INTERNATIONALE PRIVATBECHT, 35-36. 
According to the law of ~e Baltic Provinces, if <the intention of ~e parties is 
not expressed, the law of the place of performance governs. (1877) 4 CLuNEr, 
208. -
•• Torres Campos, Elementos de derecho internacional privado (4th ed. 1913) 
274 and cases cited. 
.. Art. 6 of Law of Oct. 29 (Nov. xo) x856; Areopage, Section B (1899 no. 
25), (1903) 30 CLuNEr, 210. 
20Royal Court {I9I4) 41 CLuNEr, xoog. 
27 Synnestvedt, Le droit international prive de Ia Scandinavie (1904) 259. 
28 I d., 261 • 
.. Ibid. 
30 Federal Tribunal (Jan. 22, 1904), (1905) 32 CLUNET, 453· 
30a. Federal Tribunal (June 21, 1907), (1go8) 35 CLUNEr, 932-
11 Civil Court of Geneva (March 17, 1904), (1907) 34 CLUNEr, 208. 
22 Civil Code, sec. 36 . 
.. Id., sec. 37· 
.. I d., sec. 35· 
26 
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parties in the case of contracts entered into in Austria between Aus-
trians, or between an A-ustrian and a foreigner, except where a foreigner 
bestows an exclusive benefit upon an Austrian without imposing any 
duty.35 
C. LATIN-AMERICAN LAW 
(1) Convention of Montevideo. So far as the provisions of the 
Convention of Montevidio, .of 1889, are applicable, the South American 
states are bound by the following general rules, as regards -civil trans-
actions: 
"Article 33· The same law [law of the place of performance l 
governs as regards their (a) creati9n; (b) nature; (c) yalidity; (d) 
effects; (e) consequences; (f) performance; in fact, all matters con-
cerning contracts whatever their nature. 
"Article 34· Contracts regarding specific things are governed there-
fore by the law of the place where they are at the time of the making 
of the contract. Those relating to unascertained goods sold by descrip-
tion, by the law of the debtor's domicil at the time of the execution 
of the contract; those. relating to fungible thjngs, by the law of the 
debtor's domicil at the time of the making of the contract. Those 
relating to the rendering of services (a) with respect to things, by the 
law of the place where such things are at the time the contract was 
made; (b) if their efficacy is connected with some special place, by the 
law of the place where the effect is to be produced; (c) in. other cases, 
by the law· o~ the debtor's domicil at the time of the making ot the 
contract. 
"Article 35· A contract to exchange things situated in different 
places which are subject to different laws is governed, if the parties 
have a common domicil, by the law of their domicil at the time the 
exchange was made, and in the absence of a common domicil, by the 
law of the place where the exchange was made. 
"Article 36. Accessory contracts are governed by the law applicable 
to the principal obligation. 
"Article 37· The perfection of contracts made by correspondence 
or agents is determined by the law of the place from which the offer 
was sent." 
Spc;cial rules are laid down also in the Convention on Commercial 
Law with respect to bills of exchange and other special contracts. Re: 
specting bills of exchange, it is provided that the legal relations resulting 
from the drawing are to be governed, as between the drawer and the 
payee, by the law of the place of issue, and as between the drawer·and 
the drawee, by the law of the drawe~'s domicil. The obligation of the 
acceptor in respect to the holder and the. defences available to him are 
determined by the law of the state where the acceptance took place.36 
( 2) Argentine Law. The law of the place of performance controls 
.. Stubenrauch, Co·mmentar zum osterreichischen allgemeine~~ -biirgerlichen 
Gesetzbuche (6th ed. 1892) 98 . 
.. Sees. 27-28. 
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the nature, obligation, and validity of contracts in generat.B7 The 
essential requisites of bills and notes are determined by the law of the 
place where the instrument was executed.88 
(3) Brazilian law. The new Brazilian Civil Code contains the 
following general provisions :39 
Intr. Art. 13. "With respect to the substance and effect of obliga-1 
tions, the law of the place where they were entered into shall govern, 
unless otherwise stipulated.40 
"Single Paragraph. However, the Brazilian law shall always 
govlern:C d . . f . . h. h be " . ontracts entere mto m ore1gn countnes w tc are to 
performed in Brazil · 
"II. Obligations contracted in a foreign country between Brazil-
ians." 
(4) Chilean Law. The Civil Code provides that the effect of con-
tracts to be performed in Chile is to be controlled by Chilean law.41 
According to the Chilean writers the law of the place where the contract 
is made governs otherwise.42 The Supreme Court of Chile has stated 
in a recent decision that a contract is deemed to produce its effect in 
Chile if it is necessary to sue the defendant in the Chilean courts, 
notwithstanding the fact that the agreement called for performance 
in another state. 43 
(5) Me~ican law. The Civil Code of the Federal District and of the 
District of Lower California provides : 
Art. 16. The obligations and rights arising from contracts and 
wills executed in a foreign country by Mexicans of the Federal Dis-
trict or Lower California a,re governed by the provisions of this 
code, if they are to be performed in the Federal District or in Lower 
California. 
Art. 17. If the contracts and wills to which the preceding paragraph 
refers are executed by a foreigner and are to be performed in the Fed-
eral District or in Lower California, the person executing the same shall 
be free to choose the law that shall determine their substantive validity 
so far as they relate to movable property. As regards immovable 
property, the provisions of Art. 13 shall control.44 
:n Civil Code, Arts. 1239, 1244, 1243, 1248; Molina, El derecho internacional 
privado .31 el codigo civil Argentino (1882) 183; 3. Alcorta, ·curso de derecho 
internacional privado (i89z) 233. 
18 Commercial Code, Art 738 . 
.. Bills of excl:tange are governed by the law of tJte place of execution. Art 
47, Bills of Exchange Law • 
.. T~ib. Sup. de Rio Grande do Sul (March IS, 1910), (I9II) 38 CLUNEl', 1313; 
Octav10, The Conflict of Laws of Brazil (1919) 28 YALE LAw Jo'URNAL, 467. 
41 Art. 16, Civil Code. 
42 Fabres, Le droit intertwtional prive dans la legislation de Chile (1887) 14 
CLUNET, 140; I Salas, Elementos de derecho civil·(I9I2) 4S. 
., (June 8, I9II), (1913) 40 CLUNEl', 1331. 
•• I. e. the law of the situs. 
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D. JAPANESE LAW 
Art. 7 of the Law Concerning :the Application of Laws in General 
provides as follows : 
"The law governing the creation and effect of a legal transaction is 
determined by the will of the parties. 
"If the will of the parties is not clear the law of the place where 
the transaction was entered into shall control." 
As regards contracts by correspondence, the Japanese law enacfs as 
follows:45 
"In the case of a unilateral act, the place from which the notice is 
despatched is regarded as the place or the aCt; while in the case of a 
bilateral act [contract] the place from which the offer was despatched 
is regarded as the place of the act and the formation and effect of the 
act are governed by the law of that place. If, however, the recipient 
of the offer was ignorant, at the time of his acceptance, of the place 
from which the offer had been despatched, the place of the offeror's 
domicil is rega~ded as the place of the act." 
The above summary of the law of the different countries shows that 
they are practically agreed upon the adoption of the intention of the 
parties as the fundamental rule governing the validity and effects of 
contracts (apart from capacity and formalities) in the conflict of laws. 
There is a vast difference of view, however, in the interpretation of this 
principle with respect to the various classes of contracts and the multi-
tude of questions arising from contracts in general. Much obscurity 
exists also regarding the application of the principle itself to matters 
affecting the validity of contracts as distinguished from their effects. 
To the ex:tent that the English courts and the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and of the state courts have adopted this 
rule, it is apparent, therefore, that they have not committed themselves 
to· a doctrine which has no support elsewhere, but that they accepted, on 
the contrary, a view commanding practically universal assent. We shall 
have to inquire, therefore, (I) into the meaning of the doc~rine that the 
intention of the parties governs; ( 2) into the consistency of this doc-
trine with the fundamental COJ;lceptions of Anglo-Ameri<;an law; (3) 
into the application of this doctrine to the validity and effects of con-
tracts. 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE ON THE CONTINENT THAT THE 
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IS THE GOVERNING LAW 
The origin of the doctrine that the intention of the parties governs 
the validity and effects of contracts, known as the "autonomy doctrine," 
.. Art. 9, Law Concerning the Application of Laws in General; de Becker, 
International Private Law of Japan (1919) g8. 
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·is to be found in the writings of Dumoulin. Before his time the views 
oxpressed by Bartolus had been generally followed. A distinction was 
made between the natural consequences of a ~ontract, i. e, those inhering 
in the contract itself, which Bartolus made subject to. the law: of the 
place where the contract was made; and the consequences arising sub-
sequent to its formation as. the result of negligen~e or delay, which he 
determined according to ¢-e law of the place which had been agreed 
upon for performance. If no place of performance was specified, 
Bartolus would apply the law of the forum as the law of the place where 
the negligence or delay was deemed to have occurred.46 In support 
of the above distinction Bartol us relied upon certain passages in the Cor-
pus Juris Civilis. Paul de Castro, 41 a follower of Baldus, based the 
application of the lex loci upon the fictio]:l that it is the place where the 
contract was born, contracts like persons, being subject, according to 
this writer, to the law of the place of .their origin; and Rochus Curtius48 
justified it on the ground that the parties had tacitly submitted to the law 
of the place of contracting. Whatever the theory of the old statutists 
may have been in. this matter, "it is clear that in their opinion the lex 
loci governed the intrinsic validity and direct effects of contracts as a 
matter of law, regardless of the intention of the ·parties. 
Dumoulin proclaimed with respect to contracts the principle that the 
will of the parties is sovereign, and that, if the will is not expressed, it 
must be sought in, the surrounding Circumstanc~s, the place of contract 
being one, but only one, of these circumstances.49 The application of 
the law of another state in the matter of contracts is, in the eyes of 
Dumoulin, not so much the applicati9n of a law, as the enforcement 
of a tacit agreement assumed and sanctioned by such law, to which 
he attributes the same force as is possessed by an express agreement: 
1;'his new doctrine was attacked by d' Argentr6, the champion of the 
theory of the territoriality of laws, whose influence prevailed in France 
until the time of Bouhier and Pothier. The lex loci was considered 
therefore as having obligatory .force, but the rule was subj~ct to many 
exceptions. Of the later French statutists Boullenois defended most 
whole-heartedly Dumoulin's doctrine, which became the·pr~vailing view 
in Pothier's time. Early in the nineteenth century a strong·opposition 
manifested itself again in France _to the theory that the application of 
the .lex loci results from the will of the parties, but the autonomy doc-
trine became firmly established through a decision of the Court of 
Cassation in 1836, Since then it has been applied not only to the deter-
mination o~ the rights and duties arising out of contracts admitted· to 
be valid, but also with respect to the intrinsic. validity of contracts in 
gene.ral. In connection with this new development Savigny's influence 
•Bartolus, Conflict of L~s (Beale's trans!. 1914) 18-20. 
41 1 Laine, Introduction au droit international prive (1888) x8g. 
• ld., 205. 
• Id., 229-
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appears to have been especially felt. 50 The views of this writer that 
the law of the ,place of performance should control, in the absence of 
an expressed declaration to the contrary, were not accepted, however, 
the law of the place of contracting and the common national law being 
preferred instead. 
Dumoulin's view that the will of the parties, expressed or implied, 
is the leading factor in the determination of the law governing contracts 
was accepted also by the Dutch writers. Huber says :111 
"The place, however, where a contract is entered into,· is ·not to be 
considered absolutely; for if the parties had.in mind the law of another· 
place at the time of contracting the latter will control. 'Everyone is· 
'deemed to have contracted in the place·in which he is bound to perform,' 
(Digest 44, 7, 21) ." 
The great Dutch writer John Voet52 .expressedly recognized the will of 
the parties to be sovereign in the field of contracts, except as regards 
capacity, formalities, and matters ~f public policy, but as he did not 
empha,size this part of his doctrine, it was lost sight of in his huge 
comnientary on the Pandects and exercised comparatively little influ-
ence upon.the law of foreign countries. · 
The general acceptance on the continent t!)day of the doctrine that the 
intention of the parties is the controlling consideration in the conflict 
of laws, so far as as it concerns contracts, is due in large measure to the 
influence·of Savigny. In accordance with his underlying theory· of the 
Conflict of Laws, he seeks to discover for every legal relation that 
territory to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject (in 
which it has its seat). Savigny contends that the forum of the obliga-
tion coincides with its true seat, both depending upon ·the voluntary 
submission of the parties to the local law. Such submission is generally 
by a tacit declaration of will and is always excluded by an express 
declaration to th,e contrary. "We have therefore to inquire," he says,118 
"to what place the expectation of the parties was directed-what place 
they had in their minds as· the seat of the obligation. At this place we 
must fix the ·forum of the oblig~tion, in virtue of their voluntary sub-
mis,sion. But as the obligation itself, as a legal relation, is incorporeal 
and has no locality, we must seek, in its natural process of development, 
for some visible phenomena to which we may attach the essence of the 
obligation, in order to give it; as it were, a body." 
The expectation of the parties being in the estimation of Savigny 
directed to fulfilment, he conc1udes that they must have intended to 
submit to the law of that jurisdiction:54 The place of performance 
"" i Donnedieu de Vabres, L' evolution de la jurisprudence fratzfaise en matiere 
des con/lits des lois (1888) r8o-r8r. 
01Praelect. pt. z, bk. r, ·tit. 3, n. ro. 
"'Ad Pandectas, pt. z, bk r, tit. 4. n. 18. 
03 Private International 'Law (Guthrie's trans!. r88o) rg8 . 
•• I d., 209-210. 
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is, in the first place, the place which is spech1.1ly fixed as the place of per-
formance. Such place may result from an express agreement or from 
the fact that the performance can be effected only in a particular place. 
H no place of performance has been :fixed in the manner specified, the 
plate of performance is (a) the debtor's place of business, if the duty 
in question arose out of a transaction connected with such business; 
(b) the place where the contract was entered into, if the circumstances 
cre(!.ted an expectation that its performance was to be at the same 
place; (c) the debtor's domicil, if the duty was assumed in that state, 
or if none of the other conditions above mentioned exist. 55 
"All these case~,'' says Savigny,~0 
"however various they appear, and however accidental their connection 
may seem, yet admit of being reduced to a common principle. ,It is 
always the place of fulfilment that determines the jurisdiction, either 
that expressly fixed, or that which depends on a tacit expectation. In 
both cases a voluntary submission to this jurisdictjon is to be assumed, 
unless an express declaration to the contrary e."cludes it. . • 
"The derivation of the rules here laid down from the presumed 
voluntary submission of the debtor . to a particular territorial law, 
has some weighty practical results which must here be reviewed. 
"A. This territorial law ceases tp be applicable when it is at variance 
with an absolute, strictly positive rule of law in force at the place of the 
court which decides the question (sec. 349) ; for in such cases the 
free-will of the parties can have no influence at all. 
"B. The territorial law likewise ceases to apply when the presump-
tion of voluntary submission is excluded by an expressed contrary 
intention."57 
An extreme expression of the intention theory is advocated by the 
great Belgian jurist Laureqt1 who says :58 
"Whenever parties contract they are legislators; their will takes the 
place of law. It follows £rom this that in the matter of contracts the 
q~estion is governed by entirely 'different principles from those applied 
to other juristic acts. In reality it is no longer a question of statute, 
but solely of the will of the parties. . . . Thus it is that in the matter 
of status the will of the parties counts for nothing; it is the law that 
controls, either the personal or the territorial law. In the matter of 
contractS, on the other hand, the will of the parties is everything. They 
themselves made the law; it is therefore their will which ·determines by 
what law they are to be ·governed. 
"The German jurists have given to this doctrine that the will of the 
contracting parties determines the law that shall govern their agreement 
a significant name--they call it autonomy, to indicate that the indivi-
duals are in this matter autonomous, that is to say sovereign, as were 
formerly the autonomous cities. The expression is exact, provided 
one li~its the aut.onomy of the individuals to private ~ights and inter-
.. I d., 209-210, 222 • 
.. ld., 210 • 
., ld:, 223· 
"'2 Laurent, op. cit. note 7, at pp. 383-384. 
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ests. It is certain that the contracting parties cannot determine their 
status and capacity; these matters belong to public order, and as such 
fall within the exclusive province.of the legislator. Still less can they 
regulate what belongs to the sovereign power .. To express myself in 
the language ordinarily used, everything belonging to status and to the 
real statute is beyond the autonomy of the individuals." 
Against these exorbitant claims in support of the autonomy doctrine, 
put forward by Laurent, a reaction has set in on the Continent, where 
it is conceded to-day that the will of the parties does not stand above 
the law, but that it can operate only within the limits prescribed by law. 51 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT QF INTENTION THEORY IN ENGI:AND .AND 
THE VN'ITED STATES 
The doctrine that the intention of the parties governs in the matter 
of contracts from the standpoint of the conflict of laws was introduced 
into Anglo-American law by a dictum of Lord Mansfield in the case of 
Robinson v. Bland.60 This was an action of assumpsit in three counts. 
The first count was on a bill of exchange drawn at Paris by the intestate 
on himself in England for £672, and accepted by the intestate. The 
second was for £700 lent in France to the intestate. The third count 
was for £700 had and received in France by the intestate to the use of 
the plaintiff. It was found that the bill of exchange was given at .Paris 
for £300 there lent by the plaintiff to the intestate, and lost by the latter 
to the plaintiff at play, and for £372 more, which the intestate had lost 
in the same way. It was found that the money lost at play between 
gentlemen could be recovered in France as a debt of honor before the 
marshals of France, though such money was not recoverable in the 
ordinary courts, and that money lent to play with could be recovered 
in France as a debt in the ordinary courts, and that both plaintiff and 
intestate were gentlemen. The Court of King's Bench decided that the 
bill of exchange was void and that the money lost at play could )not be 
recovered, but that the money lent could be recovered. Two of the 
three judges, including Lord Mansfield, found that th~ law of France 
and the law of England were identical with ·respect to the above points. 
Lord Mansfield stated, however, that he would have reached the same 
conclusion had the law of France and of England been proved to be 
different. In support of the applica~ion of English law he gave two 
reasons: 
"First, the parties had .a view to the laws of England. The law of 
the ·place can never be. the rule, where the transaction is entered into 
with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by 
which it is to be governed. Huberi Praelectiones7 lib. I 7 tit. 3 pa. 34, 
is clear and distinct: cveruntamen, etc. locus in quo contractus, etc. 
potius considerand', etc. se obligavit! Voet speaks to the same effect . 
.. Pillet, op. cit. note 7, at pp. 443 ff . 
.. (176o, K. B.) :2 Burr. I077· 
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"Second reason-. . . In every disposition or contract where the 
subject matter relates locally to England, the law of England must 
govern, and must have ·been intended to govern: Thus, a conveyance 
or will of land, a mortgage, a contract concermng ~tocks must be all 
sued upon in England; and the local nature of the thing requires them 
to be carried into execution according to the law here."61 
Lord Mansfield's dictum has been adopted and developed by subse-
qu,ent English cases. 
In the case of In Re .Missouri S. S. Co. Lord Justice Fry summed 
up the present doctrine of the English courts as follows :62 
"I think, therefore, the general principle on which we have to pro-
ceed is one which admits of no doubt; and the inquiry, therefore, is 
this' Looking at the subject-matter of this contract, the place where it 
was made, the contracting parties, and the things to be done, what ought 
to be presumed to have been the intention of the contracting parties 
with regard to the law which was tb govern this contract? By that I 
mean to determine its validity and its interpretation." 
Dicey63 concludes from the English decisions that the intention of 
the parties governs the effects of contracts. As regards intrinsic valid-
ity Dicey contends, however, that the parties can subject their contract 
to the operation of foreign law only indirectly, their intention being of 
great weight in determining, where the facts connect a contract with 
several states, whether the contract is a contract of the one state or of 
the other. W estlake64 feels that the English courts have come to deter-
mine the intrinsic validity of contracts on substantial considerations 
without reference to the intention of the parties, namely, by the law of 
the state with which the contract has the most real connection. 
Before the above decisions were rendered Lord Mansfield's vieW 
had been adopted in the United States.65 
Story, who purports to follow Lord Mansfield's dictum, expresses 
himself as follows: 
"The ground of this doctrine, ~s commonly stated, is that eyery person 
contracting in a country is understood to submit himself to the law of 
the place, and silently to assent to its action upon his contract. 
It would perhaps be more correct to say that the law of the place of 
the contract acts upon it, independently of any volition of the parties, 
in virtue of the general sovereignty possessed by every nation to regulate 
all persons and property and transactions within its own territory."6 G 
.. !d., 210 . 
., (188g) L. R 42 Ch. Div. 321, 340-341 . 
.. Op. cit., 545-547, 8I4 ff. 
" Op. cit., 305 . 
.. Ludlow v. Van Rmsselaer (18o6, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) I Johns. 94; Powers v. 
Lynch (18o7) 3 Mass. 77; Thompson v. Ketcham (18u N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Johns. 
146; Fanning v. Consequa (1820 N. Y. Sup. Ct.) I7 Johns. 5II; Prentiss v. 
Savage (1816) I3 Mass. 20; Van Reimsdyk v. Kane (1812, U. S. C. C. D. R. I.) 
I Gall. 37I; Cox v. United States (I832, U. S.) 6 Pet. I72 . 
.. Cot~/lict of Laws (8th ed. I883) 348-349. 
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"Another rule illustrative of the same general principle is, that the 
law of the place of the contract is to govern as to the nature, the obliga-
tion, and the interpretation of the contract, locus contractus regit 
actum.''67 
"The rules already considered suppose that the performance of the 
contract is to be in the place where it is made, either expressly or by 
.tacit implication. But where the contract is, either expressly or tacitly, 
to be performed in any other place, there the general rule is in conform-
ity to the presumed intention of the parties that the contract, as to its 
validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be· governed by 
the law of the place of performance. This would seem-to be a result 
of natural justice."68 
Story does not define what he means by the "presumed intention" of 
the parties, and the same vagueness is found in practically all subse-
quent cases. Most of them apply the law of the place of performance 
when it differs from that of the place of contracting, without reference 
to the other surrounding circumstances. In certain cases, especially 
in cases involving the defence of usury, the presumption that the parties 
contracted with respect to the law of the plac~ of performance is deemed 
to be rebutted if the contract is void under that law but valid under the 
law of the place of contracting. There are only a few cases which 
seek to find the law with respect to which they feel that the parties 
would have contracted, had their attention been called to the matter, 
from an .actual examination of the attendant circumstances. One of 
these is Grand v. Livingston.60 The question before the court in ·that 
case involved the validity of a stipulation against negligence in a bill 
of lading which had been issued in Massachusetts for the transporta-
tion of horses to New York. · "The determination of this question," 
said the learned court, "involves not only a careful examination of the 
"instrument itself, but likewise of all the circumstances attending its 
"execution." Regarding the question of intention it made the following 
observations : 
"As was suggested upon ilie argument, the question of intent can hardly 
be said to involve the actual mental operations of the parties. For, as 
a II.J.atter of fact, they probably did not stop to consider what was the 
legal effect of their agreement, or whether there was any diversity' in 
the law of the two states; and, therefore, when we speak of the 'ques-
'tion of intent,' we are making use of what may perhaps be termed a 
'legal fiction'; but, nevertheless, the law does look at the· acts of the 
parties, and the circumstances surrounding them, which may possibly 
have exerted some influence upon their actions, and then assumes that 
their intention is in harmony with such acts and circumstances." 
'l;'he position of the Supreme Court of the United States with refer-
ence to the law governing the intrinsic validity and effects of contracts 
01 !d., 351 • 
.. !d., 376. 
"" (r8g6) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N.Y. Supp. 490. 
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is not well defined.70 Some o£ its decisions purport to apply the inten-
tion theory, as, for example, the case of Pritchard v. N orlon.11 A bond 
had been executed by the defendants in the state of New York, in 
which they undertook to indemnify the plaintiff against all loss arising 
frem his liability as surety on an appeal bond executed by him on 
behal£ of the appellant in a certain suit then. pending in the Louisiana 
courts. In a suit upon the bond the defence was that the contract was 
void under the law of New York, the place of contracting, for want 
of consideration. The Supreme Court, spea:king tlrrough Mr. Justice 
Matthews, said :72 
"The phrase le.1: loci contractus is used, in a double sense, to mean, 
sometimes, the law of the place where a contract is entered into ; some-
times, that of the place of its performance. And when it is employed 
to describe the law of the seat of the obligation, it is, on that account, 
confusing. The law we are in search of, which is to decide upon the 
nature, interpretation, and validity of the engagement in question, is 
that which the parties have, either expressly or presumptively, incor-
porated into their contract as constituting its obligation. It has never 
been better described than it was incidentally by Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, IO Wheat. 48, where he defined ~t 
as a principle of universal law-'the principle that in every forum a 
'contract is governed by the law w.ith a view to which it was· made.'" 
No effect will be given to the intention of the parties if it is against 
public policy or if the provisions of a statute of the place of making 
would be avoided thereby.73 
As regards the intrinsic validity of contracts continental courts and 
writers usually content themselves with saying that the intention ·of the 
parties governs, subject to the rules of public policy. But when it 
comes to the solution of particular cases the greatest divergence of opin-
ion manifests itself. There is no agreement whatever concerning the 
fundamental basis upon which the rules of the conflict of laws are 
conceived to rest, nor in regard to the meaning of the term "public 
"policy." This appeared clearly at the meeting of the Institute of 
International Law of Paris, in 1910, when this subject was under iis-
cussi'On.7* The best that could be accomplished at the meeting was the 
adoption of the following motion, made by Renault :75 
"In order to avoid the uncertainty a,rising from the arbitrary action 
of judges compromising the interests of the parties, the Institute 
expresses the wish that each country determine as definitely as possible 
those provisions of law which it will never surrender in favor of another 
system, even though the latter should be regarded on principle as the 
competent law to regulate the legal relationship in question." 
•• See (I9IO) 23 HARv. L. REv. Ioo-I03. 
11 (I882) Io6 U. S. I24, I Sup. Ct. I02. 
72 Io6 U. S. I36-I37· 
71 See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Clemettts (IB!)I) I40 U. S. 226, u Sup. Ct. 822. 
70 (I9IO) 23 ANNUAIRE DE r: !NSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 458-48I. 
15 Id., 478. 
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"It is especially desirable that each convention relating to private 
international law should enumerate the points in regard to which the 
application of the principles adopted by the convention may be set aside 
in each contracting state by considerations of public policy." 
Since the days of the sta.tutists such operative facts as constitute 
"capacity" or "formalities" have been set apart on the Continent from 
the other operative facts relating to- the validity of legal transactions 
and have been placed under special rules, the former being subject to the 
personal law (lex patriae, lex domicilii) 16 and the latter to the. lex loci 
(locus regit actum).11 The autonomy doctrine has not been extended. 
to these questions. In England and in this country the above matters 
have not been 'dearly distinguished from. the other elements affecting 
the validity of contracts. "Capacity" to contract is governed in this 
country by the law of the state in which the contract is made, without 
reference to the law of the place of payment, or to the law with refer-
ence to which th~ parties may have otherwi~e contracted.78 In England 
the law is uncertain on the point.79 The lex loci applies also, regard-
less of the law of the place of performance or the "intention" of the 
parties, in the matter of formalities, so far as the question is not con-
nected with the statute of frauds, and as such subject to the law of the 
forum.80 'These rules are applied even in jurisdictions which adopt 
the law of the place of performance or the so-called intention theory 
in the determination of the validity of contracts in other respects. There 
are a few American cases, however, which have accepted the intention 
theory even as-regards "capacity"81 and "formalities."82 
It will be necessary now to inquire more closely into the meaning 
of the intention theory, in order to ascertain whether it can be profitably 
invoked in the solution of the problems arising in the Conflict of Laws 
with respect to contracts. 
(To be continued) 
'"Lorenzen, The Con/lie~ of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (1919) 65-67. 
'lTLorenzen, Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in tM 
Cot~flict of Laws (19II) 20 YALE LAw JoURNAL; 427, 431 ff. 
'
8 Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901) 145-146, 416 . 
.,. Dicey, op. cit., 538. 
"" Minor, op. cit., 83. 
61 Poole v. Perkins (1919) 126 Va. 331, 101 S. E. .240; Mayer v. ~oche (1909) 
77 N. ]. L. 681, 75 Atl. 235. 
The opinion in Poole v. Perkins is based upon a per-fectly'logical appli~tion of 
the intention theory. If the intention of the parties can govern the intrinsic 
validity of contracts, there is no logical reason why it should not determine also 
the "capacity" of the parties to enter into the contract The reasoning pro-
ceeds, however, from the erroneous premise that the application of the le: loci 
in determining the capacity of the parties when they are present in the state of 
contracting, results from their intention to contract with reference to such law. 
See Story, op. cit., 348-349· 
.. Hall v. Cordell (1891) 142 U. S. n6, 12 Sup. Ct 154-
